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OPENING AND CLOSING
The right of a party to open and close in introducing evi-
dence is a substantial right, not subject to a court's discretion,
and must be distinguished from another substantial right,
namely that of opening and closing in argument to the jury.
The latter is embodied in circuit court Rule 58 (formerly 59).
Either right may be waived but if taken away by the court
such ruling would be an error. Pinson v. Bowles (1920), 116
S. C. 47, 106 S. E. 775. As to these rights see West's S. C.
Digest, Vol. 18, Trial, § 25.
Both of the above rights are very important and may
mean the difference between winning and losing, so a tial
attorney must see that such a right is exercised at the proper
time or else it will be lost by waiver through his conduct.
Sirgany v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1934), 173 S. C. 120,
175 S. E. 209.
An opening statement such as is permitted in some other
jurisdictions, is not allowed in South Carolina. However, some
attorneys on either one or both sides, will, after reading a
pleading to the jury, put the issues in simple language, de-
void of technical phrases, so that the jury will have a clear
idea of what the case is about. There is no rule for or against
it, but it is practical and the writer understands it is gaining
ground in the courts. As a county judge he favored it, espe-
cially after asking some jurors if it was helpful to them and
they said it certainly was.
At this point attention is called to the fact that State v.
Atterberry (1924), 129 S. C. 464, 124 S. E. 648, is no longer
the law and should not have been annotated under Rule 58 in
the 1952 Code. The rule was changed shortly after that de-
cision in accordance with Justice Cothran's dissenting opin-
ion. A solicitor no longer can be required to make an open-
ing argument to the jury on issues of fact.
Yancy et al. v. So. Wholesale Lumber Co. (1924), 129 S. C.
48, 123 S. E. 767, at page 51 lays down the rule regarding
argument to the jury:
This state has followed the weight of authority in
holding that the right to open and close the argument to
the jury is not a matter within the discretion of the trial
Court, but is a substantial right, the denial of which is
reversible error. Addison v. Duncan, 35 S. C., 165; 14
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S. E., 305. Barnett v. Gottlieb, 98 S. C., 180; 82 S. E.
406; 38 Cyc. 101. Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 5 S. C., 267. The
question has arisen in other cases, in all of which the right
is recognized as a substantial one. [South Carolina
cases cited.]
While it is obvious that rule 59 of the Circuit Court
does not control the situation, the decisions construing
that rule disclose the reason for the rule, which really
would control if there was no such rule:
"The true test is, who would be entitled to the verdict
if the case is submitted to the jury simply upon the plead-
ings, without evidence being adduced by either side? If
the plaintiff, then unquestionably the defendant, being
the actor, would have the right to open and reply." Addi-
son v. Duncan, supra.
After the plaintiffs' cause of action had been elimi-
nated, the defendant became the complainant as to the
counterclaim. This was denied by the reply of the plain-
tiffs, and, if the case had been submitted upon these
pleadings without evidence, the verdict should have gone
to the plaintiffs. The fundamental rule is that he who
alleges must prove; he assumes the burden of conviction
and is entitled to the opening and reply.
Floyd v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1918), 110 S. C. 384, 96 S. E.
912, at page 388, gives the rule as to introducing evidence:
The rule of Court provides that the defendant shall
begin and close "where he admits the plaintiff's cause
by the pleadings, and takes upon himself the burden of
proof." The answer nowhere expressly admits the plain-
tiff's cause. It neither admits, nor does it deny, the
allegations of the complaint. It proceeds immediately
"answering both causes of action * * * and as a defense"
to set forth new matters constituting a defense to the
plaintiff's case .... The third averment furnishes the
only suggestion that the answer admitted the plaintiff's
cause. It' is true that therein the defendant admits that
the assured received the policies; but the allegation goes
further and charges that the reception was qualified by
the amended application attached to the policies which
worked an avoidance of them. The complaint made no
reference to the application, or to the amendment of it.
[Vol. 11
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The answer then made not even an indirect admission of
the allegation of the complaint, but alleged matter in
qualification of the contract the plaintiff set out. This
was clearly not such an admission of the plaintiff's case
as entitled the defendant to open and close. Kennedy v.
Moore, 17 S. C. 464; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481, 43 Am
Rep. 618; McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430, 47 Am.
Rep. 845.
The offer by the defendant's counsel at the trial to
admit the plaintiff's cause came too late; the admission
must be by the record. Johnson v. Wideman, Dudley 325.
Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1943), 202 S. C.
384, 25 S. E. 2d 243, in applying the latter rule, states at page
388 when a defendant should open and close:
By reason of the admissions in the answer, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover upon his causes of action without
first offering any proof at all, if no evidence were offered
on either side. It was therefore incumbent upon the de-
fendant to establish its defense in avoidance, and it was
upon this theory that it was allowed to open and close.
Burkhalter v. Coward, 16 S. C., 435.
The alleged clause in the policies relied upon by the ap-
pellant to defeat recovery did not relate to a counterclaim,
but constituted new matter, which under Section 488
must be taken as having been specifically denied by the
plaintiff. This made an issue, and cast upon the defend-
ant the burden of proving that the policies contained the
provisions quoted, and that no reference as to medical
treatment was endorsed upon the policies. This it failed
to do; the policies were never placed in evidence.
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